Impeding Progress, Costing Riders: Bill Banning One-Person Trains Would Lock NY Transit in the Past

Written By Blair Lorenzo
An image of a subway platform highlighting an OPTO stop mark and graffitti reading "The Wrong Side of History"

New York’s bill banning One-Person Train Operation (OPTO) goes against best practices both across the country and the world, and would leave New York’s transit system far behind its peers (Image courtesy of Franklin Tang, ETA).

The New York State Legislature has just passed a bill (S4091/A04873) that would lock New York City’s transit system in the past. This bill, which would require a conductor to be on board every train operated by New York City Transit, is the technological equivalent of requiring every elevator in the city to still be staffed by an elevator operator. If you take other transit systems both across the country and around the world, you'll quickly realize that two-person train operation (TPTO) is an outdated practice that is used almost nowhere else—and in the few cities where it is used, it is generally being phased out. Indeed, in order to provide more frequent service for more passengers, many cities across the world are moving to fully automated trains. New York should be a world leader in transportation; this 30-year-old bill would be akin to mandating pagers in the age of smartphones.

If signed into law, S4091 would immediately impact riders by reducing service and raising costs on lines that already have no conductor. It would hamstring the MTA by making automation illegal on new lines, raising costs and decreasing safety for all New Yorkers moving forward. It is also an egregious example of legislative micromanagement that undermines the ability of the MTA to modernize, innovate, and efficiently serve the public. In order to have a transit system that is able to meet the needs of millions of both current and future New Yorkers, Governor Hochul must veto this bill.

History

Since the 1920s, the NYC subway has operated trains with two crew members: a train operator who drives the train, and a conductor who operates the doors and makes announcements, a system known today as two-person train operation (TPTO). This was not always the case, however. From the introduction of the first modern elevated train lines in the 1870s through the opening of the original subway in 1904 and beyond, train doors were operated manually, necessitating that an individual conductor be present at the end of each car. During the 1920s, however, trains in New York City began to be equipped with multiple unit door control, a technology that allowed all the doors on the train to be operated by a single person, enabling TPTO. This labor-saving improvement was at first used to run more service during off-peak periods until, by the 1930s, the entire system was converted to TPTO.

In the intervening decades, other metro systems both around the country and across the world either opened new lines or converted their existing lines for one-person train operation (OPTO), in which the train driver both operates the train and controls the doors. Perhaps in response to this, S4091 was first introduced in 1995 as an attempt to enshrine TPTO into law. While this would have already been inadvisable in 1995, today there have been 30 years of advances in technology and operating practice, including in NYC itself, that the bill fails to take into account, making it even more ill-considered.

Indeed, the MTA’s own operations showcase effective transitions away from TPTO. Starting in 1997, the NYC Transit Authority (NYCTA) began to transition to OPTO on most of its shuttles: the Franklin Ave Shuttle (all times, 2 75-ft cars), the Rockaway Park Shuttle (all times except for summer weekends and holidays, 4 75-ft cars or 5 60-ft cars), the Lefferts Blvd Shuttle (late nights, 4 75-ft cars or 5 60-ft cars), the Dyre Ave Shuttle (late night, 5 51-ft cars), and the now-discontinued B-West End Shuttle. All have successfully run with OPTO in the 28 years since. Then in 2018, the MTA also transitioned to OPTO on both the G (4 75-ft cars or 5 60-ft cars) and M (4 60-ft cars) on weekends and late nights, extending the practice further, again, without incident to date.

In the early 2000s, the MTA began installing the new communications-based train control (CBTC) signaling, beginning with the L. CBTC allows trains to run in automatic train operation (ATO) mode, wherein the train drives and stops itself and the driver simply needs to monitor it. At around the same time, the MTA began to introduce its New Technology Trains (NTTs), which, among many other features, included automated announcements, greatly reducing the workload of conductors. With ATO and automatic announcements greatly simplifying the job, the MTA experimented with OPTO on the L in 2005, utilizing platform cameras to allow train operators to view the entire platform. The MTA soon had to revert the L to TPTO, however, after union pushback. 

Now, S4091 will require that

A CONDUCTOR SHALL BE REQUIRED ON ANY SUBWAY OR TRAIN OPERATED BY THE AUTHORITY WHENEVER THE SUBWAY OR TRAIN HAS MORE THAN TWO CARS ATTACHED TO THE ENGINE THEREOF.

With the Franklin Ave Shuttle set to transition to three 60-ft car trains, this will immediately require the reintroduction of conductors on all current OPTO lines. Contrary to the bill’s memo stating this will have no fiscal implications to NYS, the new conductors on these lines will have to be paid by the MTA and ultimately the state. As MTA Chairman Janno Lieber noted, this makes the bill an unfunded mandate. We believe this will immediately harm service and impede future system modernization if the governor signs it into law.

Across the world, most cities’ metros have steadily transitioned (or even started with) OPTO, or even fully automated their lines with zero-person train operation (ZPTO). This has been the case in a wide variety of cities, from smaller US cities with very old subways, like Boston and Chicago, to newer US systems, like BART in the San Francisco Bay Area, to international cities with very busy and very old subways, like London, and even to cities with trains even longer and busier than NYC’s, like Tokyo. The bill attempts to justify abandoning these best practices by asserting the subway is the “largest public transit system in the world.” 

Much as New Yorkers believe our subway to be the most special, though, we would be remiss to point out this isn’t true: 8 metro systems have more ridership than ours, and 13 are longer. Yet none force the overstaffing required in S4091. These cities have safely and effectively operated their trains with OPTO or ZPTO for decades. Meanwhile, NYC stands as a glaring exception to best practices, stuck in the past. This bill would cement into law an outdated 20th-century operating practice that now only exists on three systems: the NYC subway, PATH (legally a commuter railroad), and Toronto’s TTC.

Misguided Intentions

Most of the bill’s justification rests on claims that OPTO threatens public safety. These claims are groundless, but also mostly cover for the bill’s true purpose. This is revealed in the last sentence, claiming that OTPO would cause “further loss of jobs to NYC.” This bill is not about safety, but rather an unfunded program designed to protect one single job type from eventual obsolescence. 

Make no mistake: there is no transit without transit workers. Transit workers often work in very difficult and stressful circumstances, and ensuring that they are compensated and treated fairly—and that workers maintain their livelihoods—is essential. This bill, however, attempts to achieve this by decreasing efficiency. This will either force cuts to service, leading to a loss in revenue from paying passengers, or a raise in operating costs. Either way, that puts the MTA on worse financial footing, making it harder, not easier, to keep transit workers employed. One of the most reliable threads in transit politics is that the more of a transit system’s costs fares cover, the more stable and culturally accepted it tends to be. OPTO frees up personnel to bolster off-peak service and attract more riders, improving farebox recovery and insulating frontline employees from swings in governance.

Advocates, including ETA, have been calling for off-peak and weekend service increases in the Six Minute Service campaign, and retaining existing OPTO would reduce operating costs, helping make that goal a reality. Instead, this bill would unimaginatively create make-work, the analog of requiring bringing back staffed cabooses on freight trains that were eliminated decades ago.

Just as the bill fails to save costs, so too does it fail to improve safety. The proof comes in analyzing the bill’s speculative claim that lawsuits “caused by the absence of the conductor could negate any savings and become more costly.” This claim likely dates to the bill’s origin in 1995, and might have been understandable then with a lack of data. Three decades later, OPTO has not led to increased liability problems, nor has it been implicated in safety issues. This is because while the bill correctly points out that reduced visibility from impediments, including curved platforms, could be dangerous, the MTA has taken care to implement OPTO safely. On half-length trains, the burden for one operator is no higher than for a conductor on a full-length train. When the MTA wanted to bring OPTO to the L line, it installed cameras on every platform, with displays mounted on the ends for the operator to get full platform visibility. These careful approaches have addressed the potential safety risks, as transit agencies around the world do for OPTO trains longer than the ones in service in NYC.

Modern trains are also fundamentally safer than the rolling stock that was common on the subway when this bill was originally designed. They include cameras, sensors, CBTC, and other technologies that assist the MTA in keeping riders safe without needing two-person staffing. 

Finally, with regards to public safety, New York City is simply not the same place it was in 1995. In the intervening three decades, crime rates have plummeted to historic lows, with even the pandemic-era blip already in the rearview mirror. More importantly, it may have been possible to argue that conductors played a public safety role in 1995, when most train types required conductors to frequently move between cabs, putting them in direct contact with riders. Today, however, conductors operate entirely from closed cabs, isolated from passengers on the train. Given that all new subway trains already have call buttons to contact the train operator, it is difficult to credibly argue that conductors offer any benefit to public safety.

Effect on Rider Benefits and Service

Directly Hinders Frequency & Accessibility

This bill actively works against the public’s desire for more frequent and accessible transit service, especially during off-peak hours and weekends. When it comes to running trains, labor is by far the largest marginal cost. As such, mandating two operators will dramatically increase the cost of running more trains, making expanded service economically unpalatable.

Moreover, even if the MTA has the money for more operators, that doesn’t necessarily mean there will be extra operators suddenly available: it takes time and money to hire and train skilled crews. This became an issue, for example, during the 2023-2024 shutdown of the 63rd St Tunnel. While the intent was for R train service to be increased to compensate, not enough trains could be run, in large part due to operator shortages. This bill, if signed, would go into effect immediately, risking a recurrence of this exact same scenario.

No other major transit global subway system mandates a two-person crew by law—indeed, most such systems do not utilize TPTO at all. This is doubly true for modern, automation-capable trains, such as those running on NYC’s new CBTC lines. If this bill becomes law, New York would become an outlier, preventing it from achieving the service levels enjoyed by world-class cities elsewhere.

Exacerbates the Transit Affordability Crisis

Labor costs are by far the single greatest expense in transit operations. This bill unnecessarily inflates these costs, ultimately shifting the burden onto riders through potential fare hikes or reducing the capacity for much-needed service improvements. Again: transit workers deserve fair compensation and fair treatment, but legislating outdated practices is not the way to achieve it.

It is fiscally irresponsible to enshrine an inefficient operational model into law, especially when the MTA faces significant financial challenges, which compound the state’s failure to fund the agency’s operations consistently. This bill further handcuffs the MTA from being a good steward of taxpayer and rider money.

Call to Action

In the service of alleviating outdated safety concerns, this legislation would financially burden the MTA, hurting both transit workers and riders and limiting system modernization. As a result, ETA calls on the Legislature to rethink its flawed legislation, and ask Governor Hochul to not allow such a harmful and regressive bill to come into effect.

Appendix: Wild Inaccuracies

While not necessarily pertinent to the issues at hand, S4091 is not only harmful and outdated, but riddled with wild inaccuracies. These deserve to be called out, however, as they highlight the lack of due consideration put into this bill, and how out of touch it is with the MTA’s realities:

  • “the New York city subway system, the largest public transit system in the world”
    The NYC subway is not the largest public transit system in the world. It is 9th by ridership, 14th by route length, and roughly around 7th by revenue track length. In 1995, it may have still been the longest rapid transit system by revenue track length, but it is 2025 now, and it is not anywhere close anymore. And by ridership, it hasn’t been close to #1 (Tokyo) for a long time. More importantly, every single transit system that is larger than NYC’s, no matter how you count it, uses OPTO or ZPTO.

  1. AW3 is seated passengers plus 6 passengers/m2

  2. ((42 seats + 198 standees) * 2 + (44 seats + 202 standees) * 3) * 2 = 2436 for a 10-car R160 train.

  3. The 53rd St Tunnel carried 52,600 people per hour into Manhattan between 8-9 am in 1989.

Acknowledgements

ETA would like to thank the following for contributing to this statement:

  • Alon Levy

  • Madison Feinberg

  • Robert Hale

  • Darius Jankauskas

  • Tim Lazaroff

  • Blair Lorenzo

  • Khyber Sen

Blair Lorenzo
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