Below is ETA’s official public comment on the 125 St Subway Draft scoping, followed by individual comments given by ETA staff at various scoping meetings.
ETA Official Comment
Editor’s Note: This public comment was submitted by ETA on Friday, November 13 in response to an MTA call for comments on the 125 St tunneling environmental review.
Dear 125th Street Subway Tunnel team,
The Effective Transit Alliance is a 501(c)(3) non-profit research and education organization dedicated to improving the way transit is built and operated in the New York region. We are writing to express our support of the extension of the Second Ave Subway across 125 St as the right project on the right route, but urge the MTA to reduce the depth of tunnels and stations before the design is locked in. The shallower the tunnel, the cheaper the project will be, and a cheaper project will be easier to fund and faster to complete. Our full analysis is in our report, Digging Out of a Very Deep Hole: Saving Billions on 125th Street (August 19, 2026).
Summary of Recommendations
Construct the 125 St subway tunnels utilizing the TBMs from Phase 2.
Adopt a shallower tunnel profile by adjusting the grade of the Phase 2 tail tracks.
Evaluate alternative construction methods for stations including the Milan method, ground freezing, box jacking, the cellular arch method, and the tubular roof construction method.
Publish station depth, time-to-platform, transfer time, and cost estimates for various shallower methods as options in the environmental review.
1. Tunnel Depth Will Shape the Entire Line
The MTA’s conceptual design for the western expansion in its Feasibility Study envisioned stations up to 130 feet deep. As a result of this design, travel times were significant: for two stations, it would take more than five minutes to travel from the surface to the station platform. This would negatively impact utility for passengers, especially when making crosstown trips or transferring to and from the line.
2. Depth Drives Cost
Deeper stations increase dig volumes linearly with depth, but costs increase more than linearly with depth, leading to more expensive mining techniques and contributing to the $1.2 billion hard cost alone projected for each station, before contingency. There is no environmental or passenger experience reason for this. To the contrary, overly deep stations worsen the passenger experience by increasing the travel time from the platform to the street or to the existing subway stations. Deep stations also often require larger mezzanines for NFPA 130 compliance if sufficient vertical circulation is not built, an expensive proposition for such a deep station.
In fact, on London’s Elizabeth line, Tottenham Court Road station’s designers went to considerable effort to build it as shallowly as possible, which was 80 ft compared with about 100 ft at the other Central London stations, and led to a station that both has the lowest dig volume among the Central London stations and the lowest cost per dig volume, resulting in a $590 million station in a more difficult environment than that of Harlem, built for trains 50% longer than those of SAS.
3. Study Alternative Construction Methods
The tunnel study must take the above into account and avoid locking in excessive depth. It should look for ways to reduce depth. Our report has examples of how techniques used in Milan, Seoul, and Shanghai can reduce the minimum separation between the SAS West stations and the existing subway stations to the point of allowing the stations to be only ~60 ft deep, and the Broadway station even shallower at 20-30 ft deep. This would also permit cut-and-cover construction. Subway trains already climb 5.5% grades, which should enable a Lenox station of reasonable depth.
4. Related Design Considerations
The tail tracks currently envisioned in the project scope should also be subjected to scrutiny. Storage for six trains is excessive by international standards; in fact, only around 100 feet of overrun capacity is strictly necessary, and the original SAS Phase 2 FEIS had tail tracks for four trainsets, not six. Adopting this design would reduce project cost by reducing tunneling length. It would also enable reduced costs by enabling TBM extraction at the Broadway station rather than extracting it at additional cost near 137 St. This could be done by constructing the Broadway station and its crossover and minimal tail tracks via cut-and-cover, which would be cheaper than a mined approach while doubling as a TBM extraction pit.
The scoping study should also examine the impacts of ancillary structures for the purposes of ventilation and egress. NFPA 130 only requires ventilation openings be six inches above roadway level. And indeed, most existing subway ventilation is already built this way. Ancillary structures are not required for this. Grand Street on the B/D has grates integrated into the raised street median. Internationally, ancillary ventilation buildings are uncommon; alternatives that integrate the structures into the streetscape include bench-height grates on Berlin’s U5 extension and on the Copenhagen Metro, or thin tubes the size of an advertising board in Copenhagen. Similarly, emergency exits can be located on sidewalks without any structures, as they are on the existing NYC subway.
5. Specific Requests
We request the MTA:
Evaluate a shallower alignment and station profile using the Milan method, the cellular arch method and tubular roof construction, and/or underpinning, and compare each to the current mined-cavern concept.
Publish for every alternative the station depth, entry-to-platform time, transfer times, and construction cost.
Re-examine the 3% maximum grade assumption against a 4-5% standard for EMUs, including the fact that NYCT’s current ruling grade is 5.5%.
Set measurable goals for the project, such as a target maximum station depth, maximum entry-to-platform time, and per-mile cost comparisons against similar international projects and report against them.
Respond in the final environmental document to the technical points in the attached report.
This is an important project for Harlem and the region, and we want to see that it is built right. Setting the correct depth now will lower construction costs and shorten every trip for the life of the line.
Thank you for your time and we would welcome a conversation to further discuss our analysis.
Contributors
ETA would like to thank the following contributors for their work on this statement:
Robert Hale
Darius Jankauskus
Blair Lorenzo
Khyber Sen
ETA Staff Public Comments
Khyber Sen, online session, Oct 22:
Hi! My name is Khyber Sen and I live nearby in Manhattan Valley, and I’m a member of the Effective Transit Alliance. This is a great project, and I'm really excited to be able to get across 125th much faster, as the buses are painfully slow at the moment. However, in the feasibility study, it said all of the stations will be over 100 ft deep and take over 5 minutes just to reach the platforms, which means a trip along or transferring on 125th will add 10 extra minutes of travel time, which will make it way less useful. And deep stations will of course also mean very expensive ones. At $6 billion per mile, this will be by far the most expensive subway in the world. Extending the TBMs to build the tunnels now is great, but this also means the tunnels lock in the future station placement, which means we’re stuck with 5 min access times forever, so I’d like to ask that the environmental review incorporate alternatives for tunnel depth and station placement. The distance between the two tunnels will also influence station width, so I ask for that to also be considered in the alternatives. We have also written a report outlining various construction techniques that the feasibility study didn't explore, so that should be considered as well.
Khyber Sen, public session, Oct 27:
Hi! My name is Khyber Sen. I live nearby in Manhattan Valley, and I'm here on behalf of the Effective Transit Alliance.
This is a great project, and it should be built. Harlem badly needs a fast crosstown connection, and reusing the Phase 2 TBMs will save time and money.
But the scope has a major gap: stations will only get a separate review later. But once these tunnels are dug, they fix how deep and wide the stations can be. The feasibility study puts them up to 130 ft deep and up to five minutes just to reach the platforms. If 10 min is added to each trip, many riders will opt to walk instead, like they do now when the bus is too slow. And depth is the main reason that, at 6 billion dollars per mile, this would be the most expensive subway in the world.
So please treat station depth, and the tunnel spacing that sets station width, as irreversible commitments of this EIS. Right now the scope only studies no build and construction methods. Please add alternatives for a shallower tunnel profile. Study Milan-method cut-and-cover stations, using slurry walls, proven in New York, decking that reopens the street quickly, and ground freezing, used in Phase 1. Where the street can’t be opened, study the cellular arch method, used in Seoul. Study grades up to 5.5%, which the Q already runs on the Manhattan Bridge, and which would allow Broadway to be much shallower. And study much less clearance under existing stations, worth it even if it means underpinning. In wet, sandy soil like on 125th, Nanjing and Shanghai have built new stations just 2 and 4 ft under existing lines. And study narrower stations: the feasibility study has them at 75 ft wide, even though 116 St on Second Avenue will only be 59 ft wide, and the very busy Lex/125th will be just 63 ft wide.
Stations only 60 ft deep could cut the cost by more than half. It should also be a project goal to minimize access times and project cost and maximize utility. Our full report has the details, and we’ll submit more in writing. Thank you.
Darius Jankauskus, public session, Oct 27:
Hello, my name is Darius Jankauskas, and I'm a member of the Effective Transit Alliance. I'm excited about the potential benefits of this project to the community, increasing the ease of both commutes and recreational travel over congested 125th street. However, I'm concerned that the interaction between the different phases of the project may be locking in suboptimal decisions.
The initial feasibility study considers exceedingly deep stations, over 100 feet deep. This will lead to escalator travel into the station taking sometimes over five minutes. That decreases the usefulness of the project for many trips, especially those limited to the 125th street corridor, where station access alone will add 10 minutes to trips.
This EIS process is currently scoped to include only tunnel construction, not station design. However, tunnel design will lock in station depth and likely construction techniques. If the tunnel is 130 feet deep, so too will the station and access facilities. This will add project costs and limitations to utility that are currently not being analyzed and that the public is not being given sufficient opportunity to comment on. Treating station design as independent of tunnel design is convenient, but fundamentally incorrect.
Additional tunnel design considerations, like TBM pit sites, may increase construction impacts if not planned in tandem with station construction. The MTA should consider using a station cut-and-cover site to double as a TBM pit, leading to more efficient and less disruptive construction.
The two phase approach of this project is exciting, and offers opportunities for more efficient construction. However, initial station design should be included in the current EIS analysis.
Additionally, lower-impact ventilation systems should be considered. New metros abroad rely heavily on ventilation grates at or slightly above sidewalk level. Adopting this approach here will decrease impacts on the surrounding neighborhood and reduce costs.
John Ericson, public session, Oct 27:
Hi, I'm John Ericson, with the Effective Transit Alliance. I am pleased to hear that the MTA is well aware of our report on the 125th Street subway and is studying it. Thank you. I'll keep my remarks brief to remind both the MTA and the interested public about the most important points in our report.
In short, the subway is a very useful project in concept, but current plans place it far too deep underground. Excess depth both wastes money and makes a worse subway. Today I will focus on the latter.
A too-deep subway works for trips leaving Harlem, but it is no good for trips within Harlem. Even when buses are barely moving, it doesn't make sense for a rider to spend five minutes descending into the bowels of Manhattan, ride a mere stop or two, and then spend five more minutes rising to the surface. That's ten minutes spent going nowhere. We want a subway that, yes, helps residents commute to jobs elsewhere, but also helps them visit friends and local businesses within the neighborhood.
We applaud trying to reuse the Phase 2 TBMs to cut costs. If that means two separate EISes, so be it. But we must, must keep in mind that the tunnels we commit to now are irrevocable decisions we will never be able to get away from. Now, in the next EIS, is the time to commit to shallow tunnels so we can have the best, and cheapest, 125th Street subway possible. Again, our report spells out exactly how to accomplish this.
Thank you.
Khyber Sen, public session, Nov 12:
Hi! My name is Khyber Sen, I live nearby in Manhattan Valley in Senator Cleare’s district, and I'm part of the Effective Transit Alliance. We wholeheartedly support the project and want to see it be done as best as possible, maximizing utility and minimizing cost. It will greatly benefit both myself and hundreds of thousands of other New Yorkers, as a fast crosstown line north of midtown is sorely lacking. Our aim is thus to make the project better and cheaper so that it is more likely to be fully funded, actually built, and built soon. To this aim, we’ve released a report outlining a variety of construction techniques, which have been utilized internationally and in previous MTA projects, to reduce station depths while still minimizing impacts. This reduces costs as well as station access times, as right now it will take over 5 minutes just to reach the platform. We hope these recommendations are considered.
Before recent discussions with the MTA, we were under the impression that the feasibility study was the initial design of the project, with the preliminary design now underway building on that initial design. Moreover, we assumed that the EIS would prescribe the tunnel’s vertical alignment and thus lock in all of the station placements. It seems this is also how most of the public has perceived it. However, from talking to MTA planners and Jamie Torres-Springer, it sounds more like the feasibility study was only done to determine the actual feasibility of the project, and that its tunnel profile and station designs are not actual designs for the project, and that the preliminary design now underway will determine those critical details. If we are understanding this correctly, we ask that the draft EIS clearly explain this, and in particular, explain exactly what the EIS allows as modifications still within its scope and what it locks into the design. For example, we assume that the EIS will lock in the horizontal alignment of the tunnel, but if it does not lock in the tunnel profile and the station depths, this should be made very clear.
Thank you.
Robert Hale, public session, Nov 12:
Hi, I’m Robert Hale. I'm a member of the Effective Transit Alliance but speaking for myself tonight. I support the 125th Street subway—the case for it writes itself, but it needs to be shallower so it’s more convenient and cheaper. If the stations end up built as the feasibility study suggests, up to 130 ft underground, every crosstown rider will have to build in 5 minutes just to reach the platform. Deep stations also drive up costs dramatically. This line's projected $6 billion per mile cost would set a new record, and it threatens the subway’s financial viability. The stations account for most of that. If no changes are made, the stations will average $1.2 billion each in hard costs alone. By contrast, the Elizabeth Line's Tottenham Court Road station cost half that, even though it's in the heart of London, was built in a more complex environment than Harlem, and serves trains one-third longer than B-Division ones.
The scoping process must include alternatives for minimizing tunnel and station depth, station box sizes, mezzanines, and ancillary buildings. We have written a report outlining construction techniques that the feasibility study didn't explore. The project should descope the tail tracks so the tunnel boring machine stops at the Broadway station site rather than at a separate pit. Moreover, if at all possible, the Phase 2 Lexington Avenue station should be redesigned at a reduced depth and with direct access to the Metro-North platforms restored, and the 116th Street station should be built without a below-platform mezzanine. Every saved construction dollar is a dollar the MTA doesn't have to squeeze out of President Trump or its riders. Every minute saved on platform access makes the subway more attractive compared to a car.
Khyber Sen, written submission, Nov 13:
Dear 125th Street Subway Tunnel team,
I am pleased to hear that many people on your team have already read our report on the 125 St Subway, etany.org/reports/digging-out-deep-hole-sas-west. As explained in the report, we wholeheartedly support extending the Second Avenue Subway across 125 St. It is an excellent idea, both the alignment itself and reusing the TBMs. We most certainly want this project to be built, but we want to make sure it is built in the best way possible, maximizing utility. This also means significantly reducing the cost, as a cheaper subway will be far more likely to be fully funded, actually built, and built soon. When we argue for modifications to the project, we intend them to create an ultimately better project, and one that is more likely to be funded and thus become a reality. With this aim, our report examines the feasibility study and recommends a variety of potential techniques used around the world, including some here in NYC already, to minimize the depth of the stations, and thereby also the station access times and the cost. We hope these recommendations are duly considered, and judging by our conversations thus far, we seem to be on the right track.
Before any discussions with the MTA planners on this team, we were under the impression that the feasibility study released prior to the draft scoping was the initial design of the project. We understand that the preliminary (30%) design and engineering phase had just kicked off, so it wasn’t in a very advanced stage of design, but still the very initial design nonetheless. Moreover, we assumed that the EIS for the tunnel would prescribe the tunnel’s vertical and horizontal alignment, and thus lock in all of the station placements. It seems this is also how most of the public has perceived it. However, from talking to MTA planners and Jamie Torres-Springer, it sounds more like the feasibility study was only done to determine the actual feasibility of the project, and that its tunnel profile and station designs are not actual designs for the project, and that the preliminary design now underway will determine those critical details. If we are understanding this correctly, we ask that the draft EIS clearly explain this, and in particular, explain exactly what the EIS allows within its scope and what it locks into the design. For example, we assume that the EIS will lock in the horizontal alignment of the tunnel, but if it does not lock in the tunnel profile and the station depths, which will then be determined by further design, this should be made very clear.
The project goals also state that it must avoid or minimize any impacts to Phase 2. However, these should be considered holistically. If an option causes an impact to Phase 2 that lowers the overall cost of both projects, or significantly increases the utility of the 125 St subway at minor impact to Phase 2, those tradeoffs should be weighed against each other instead of immediately dismissing them. For example, while the depth of the Lexington Av station is likely set in stone by now, with blasting having begun, the depth and grade of the tail tracks, to be dug by the TBM, are likely not. Raising them could save billions at the Lenox Av station. Moreover, even if some of these are requirements of the full funding grant agreement, such as tail track storage size, effort should be made to amend them, especially as the federal landscape rapidly changes.
In particular, since Lexington Av will only be a short-lived, temporary terminal, its terminal facilities can be descoped, i.e., its storage tail tracks and western crossover removed. As explained in the report, storage tail tracks reduce operating costs by reducing deadheading, but aren’t necessary beyond the short overrun tracks. Thus, the tail tracks can be put on a grade instead, which works as overrun tracks, but is not ideal for storage (that said, NYCT rolling stock specifications require trains to be capable of being indefinitely parked on a 5.5% grade). Plus, the second crossover is not needed, and only the one to the east of the station is needed. Both of these will allow the Lenox Av station to be much more shallow; a 4% grade, routine for NYCT, would let Lenox Av be only 50 ft deep.
Then at Broadway, there are a multitude of options. If the six trainset storage requirement from the FFGA is amendable, a reduction to two or four trainsets could save hundreds of millions, and should be compared to the lifetime operating cost of reduced storage. In the original 2004 FEIS for SAS, Phase 2 ended with storage for just four trainsets, so clearly at one time it was perfectly acceptable, and it has already been environmentally cleared. And if the FFGA is not amendable, then there are still options. The current tail track plan avoids storing trains on the curve, and may have to extend the tunnel farther to find a suitable TBM extraction site. If it is linearly compressed, wasting tunnel length on an empty curve could reduce costs. If the Broadway station is significantly raised to 20-30 ft deep, then cut-and-cover for both the station, its crossovers, and tail tracks becomes much cheaper (it is for this reason that it’s most important to make Broadway shallow from a cost perspective, since the crossovers before and after the station are not TBM dug). This also means the tail tracks can be quad tracked to reduce their length, with the inner two being within the platform’s width, as is common in China, for example. Then finally, if significantly more storage is beneficial, then reusing the Freedom Tunnel should be explored, as outlined in our report appendix, providing a full yard-sized storage for the Q and relieving Coney Island Yard.
Similarly, a cost-benefit analysis must be applied to the interplay between station depth, egress capacity, and mezzanine size. At the Phase 2 Lexington Av station, for example, there is a full-length, partial-width mezzanine, with full-width sections at both ends and in the middle. The full length is required due to NFPA 130’s 6 minute egress requirement to a point of safety (the mezzanine or above). However, the mezzanine is only needed for this because the mezzanine-to-surface egress capacity is undersized, leading to mezzanine queuing that prevents the surface from being a reachable point of safety. Had the escalators at Park Av not been descoped, the mezzanine would have had enough egress capacity to eliminate the full-length mezzanine and central stairs, leaving only the mezzanines at each end. This would have saved significant cost in mining out a full-length mezzanine, but would have incurred the cost of a second escalator bank, which is not cheap either. Thus, the deeper the station, the greater the tradeoff between mezzanine size and egress capacity matters. This tradeoff should be determined through a cost-benefit analysis. However, if the platform is raised much higher, then passing the 4 minute and 6 minute NFPA 130 tests with the surface as the point of safety becomes substantially easier, allowing you to save on both a smaller mezzanine and less egress capacity.
This is a critical project, and we hope that it can be built as best as possible. We hope that it will also be a project goal to minimize station access and transfer times and reduce costs, just as it is a project goal to reduce surface impacts. Both of these are important, and we hope the right balance can be struck, and that the alternatives analysis duly investigate ways to achieve this.
Thank you for your consideration of all our comments, both here and the many ones made by our organization in person as well. We would welcome further discussion at any time to discuss our analysis.
Sincerely,
Khyber Sen
Director of Transit Operations and Planning
Effective Transit Alliance